T he problem of harmful, unnecessary and neglected pain has been studied extensively in many healtb care settings over the peist decade. Research has documented the incidence of untreated pain, and scholars and advocates bave given tbe problem several names: "public healtb crisis,"^ "oligoanalgesia,"2 and "moral failing,"^ among tbem. Articles bave identified a litany of now familiar "obstacles" or "barriers" to effective pain relief.* Eacb of tbese individual obstacles or barriers bas been tbe subject of targeted remedial action in at least some context.
Tbe cbecklist approacb to improving care for patients in pain, bowever, is likely to bave only limited effect. Wbat really appears to be operating is a complex ecosystem tbat supports ambivalence, denial, and even suspicion of tbe circumstance of patients in pain and efforts to treat tbem. Pain relief in emergency medicine, a relatively new setting for tbe study of cballenges to treating pain, provides a revealing context for viewing discrete obstacles to effective pain management in medicine as part of an integrated environment into wbicb patients with pain enter for treatment.
It is pain that drives most patients to seek care in an emergency department.^ In the majority of patients, the pain that drives them is quite severe, rating an 8 of 10 on commonly used pain scales.^ Emergency medicine, however, does not focus on tbe management and relief of pain. Pain is most commonly, and necessarily, viewed as a symptom tbat guides tbe pbysician to a diagnosis of an underlying pathology. It is only when pain is viewed merely as a symptom, ratber tban a pathology itself, that there is a problem.
The model of pain as merely a symptom does not serve a good number of patients coming to tbe ED witb pain. In fact, a significant proportion of emergency patients suffer serious and debilitating cbronic pain;7 and approximately 11% of patients seeking treatment in tbe ED do so for pain related to cbronic conditions.^ For persons witb cbronic diseases associated witb acute episodes of pain, including sickle cell and migraines for example, tbe sole purpose for tbe visit is pain relief. Altbougb active diagnostic efforts may still be necessary to rule out otber conditions tbat may be causing tbis particular pain episode, tbe treatment of tbe pain itself is obviously tbe primary objective of emergency treatment in tbose cases.
Even witb tbe need to focus on diagnosis and treatment of tbe condition causing tbe pain, bowever, pain management and pain relief sbould be a priority in emergency medicine. Tbe ethical duty to relieve pain is well establisbed. Altbougb tbere may be etbical and medical concerns about particular pain management interventions in particular circumstances, tbe core etbical obligation to relieve pain is well establisbed in medicine, including in emergency medicine. Tbe Code of Ethics of the American College of Emergency Physicians, for example, formally recognizes an obligation to relieve pain as a part of emergency treatment.^ Relieving pain and suffering bas been called a "fundamental imperative for any clinician"; and, in regard to emergency medicine: "as a guiding principle of medicine and core covenant witb our patients, every EP [emergency physician] must embrace providing timely and effective pain control as a fundamental duty."^ Otber equate analgesia was not provided in tbe first instance.^'D espite tbe clarity of tbe etbical principles and the documented outcomes of untreated pain, research on the treatment of pain in emergency medicine has revealed a pattern of inadequacy. In 1989, Wilson and Pendleton applied the term "oligoanalgesia" to the neglect of pain in the ED and documented that 56% of patients in the ED presenting with pain received no analgesia; furthermore, when narcotic analgesics were provided, they were provided in doses too low to be effective.^'' In particular, tbere is evidence of disparities in tbe treatment of patients for pain in tbe emergency department based on race and etbnicity.^** Tbis evidence mirrors racial disparities in tbe assessment and treatment of pain in medicine generally.^s Similarly, studies bave demonstrated tbat cbildren receiving treatment in tbe ED are mucb less likely to receive pain medication for clearly painful conditions as compared to adults
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emergency pbysicians bave observed tbat " [o] pportunities to save lives wdthin the ED are rare, but opportunities to relieve pain are nearly infinite...."" Tbese statements represent specific application of more general etbical norms to tbe particular context of emergency medicine.'Î n addition to etbical norms that support serious attention to pain management generally, there are pragmatic reasons, specific to emergency medicine, that support an emphasis on pain relief as a priority. One might mistakenly view pain associated with an emergency condition as a temporary, though serious and intense, experience. Studies on the relationship between cbronic pain and acute pain episodes, bowever, indicate tbat an experience of unrelieved, acute pain can make a person vulnerable to a pattern of cbronic pain'^ or to a repeat pain episode.^* Studies bave also indicated that managing pain post-surgically promotes recovery, while persons with untreated pain are more likely to experience complications after medical treatment.^^ It seems reasonable to extend tbese findings to untreated pain caused by trauma or non-surgical but painful medical procedures as well. Finally, one migbt speculate tbat a patient's experience witb painful procedures could lead tbat person to delay or avoid necessary medical diagnosis and treatment of a later episode or a new symptom. In fact, tbere is some evidence tbat a procedure may be more painful tbe next time it is employed if adpresenting witb tbe same conditions.^o As in tbe case of racial disparities, tbe evidence of neglect of treatment for pain in cbildren in the ED parallels identified problems in tbe care of cbildren in otber bealth care settings.^^ Because approximately one-third of ED visits involve treatment of cbildren, tbis bas been a significant concern, addressed aggressively in some bospitals.^Ê mpirical researcb on the reasons for tbe neglect of pain in tbe emergency department is quite tbin. Tbe pace of publication on issues of pain management in tbe ED increased significantly between 1996 and 2003,^3 bowever, and appears to bave continued an exponential growth since that time, indicating a promise of more research to come.
Despite the increase in attention, the problem of undertreatment of pain in tbe ED persists. As in otber areas of medical practice, institutional initiatives in emergency medicine, including educational interventions and tbe establishment of departmental protocols to improve the treatment of pain in EDs, although sometimes successful, have very often produced disappointing results.^* Similarly, clinical guidelines on pain management standing alone have not been proven effective in cbanging pbysician practices.^s Tbe lack of strong success in tbese efforts may be attributed to tbe design or implementation ofthe specific intervention. For example, Ducharme, in his article in this symposium, notes that practice guidelines are more effective when there is personalized follow-up and mentoring with physicians in their own practice. The pattern of disappointing results in some of these remedies to identified barriers (for example, clinical guidelines responding to deficiencies in knowledge base), bowever, may reveal instead that the reasons and root causes of undertreatment of pain in the ED are still not well understood.
There is a more substantial literature on barriers to effective pain management in otber areas of medical practice.26 Tbe obstacles identified generally in medical practice include financial restrictions, educational deficiencies, cultural cballenges, and legal and regulatory concerns, among otbers. It is likely tbat some of tbe reasons for undertreatment of pain in tbe ED are tbe same as tbose for medical practice generally. For example, some observers and practitioners bave identified deficiencies in tbe educational programs that prepare emergency physicians.^F urther, while financial issues, including payment and reimbursement for care, bave been identified as significant barriers for pain patients outside of tbe bospital setting,^** tbe emergency department faces different financial issues. For emergency medicine, financial constraints are often expressed in terms of capacity relating to patient load and crowding.^s One migbt expect tbat tbe volume of demands on tbe ED negatively impact attention to pain management. At least one study, bowever, bas indicated tbat staff-patient ratio (weigbted by acuity of tbe patients' conditions) did not affect tbe proportion of patients wbo received pain medication. 30 As in otber settings, institutional structure and procedures may also form barriers to effective pain relief in tbe ED. For example, ED procedures, typically requiring at least seven steps ("patient presentation and registration, nursing assessment and triage, placement in a treatment room, primary nurse assessment and documentation, pbysician evaluation, pbysician ordering of pain medication, nursing obtaining pain medication, and finally,... nursing administration of pain medication") before tbe patient can receive any pain medication, create a formidable barrier to timely treatment and tbe avoidance of unnecessary suffering.^^ Several studies bave documented lengtby delays in tbe first administration of pain medication to ED patients suffering serious trauma,^^ and studies of patient's expectations indicate tbat these delays are probably a source of significant concern to patients.^^ Pre-bospital emergency medical services bave also been identified as a target for improvement of pain relief for tbe emergent patient.^* Tbe practice of emergency medicine is quite different from otber areas of practice, bowever, and some of tbe reasons for neglect of pain may also be distinctive. Because tbere is little empirical researcb on obstacles to effective pain management in tbe ED, most of tbe reasons given for tbe phenomenon in emergency medicine emerge from intuition and experience or are extrapolated from the few studies that exist. Further research is certainly required, but some preliminary conclusions are possible.
Distinctive reasons for undertreatment of pain in emergency departments include tbe prioritization of diagnosis over pain relief; inadequacies in tbe process of pain assessment; and a culture tbat supports significant detacbment from patients. Recent literature bas identified legal risks as an additional cause of concern for emergency pbysicians.^^ Areas of liability risk, including litigation over recklessness in tbe neglect of treatment for pain, spotlight systemic issues tbat impact tbe quality of treatment for pain in tbe ED. Tbese include discontinuity of care, especially relating to arranging for tbe treatment of pain upon discbarge as well as inadequate pain management by providers outside tbe ED; cballenges of palliative care in tbe ED; limitations on tbe scope of practice of emergency bealtb care professionals tbat affect tbe timeliness of pain management interventions; and issues around informed consent. In addition, no discussion of emergency departments would be complete witb consideration of tbe application of tbe federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) to tbe question of treatment for pain. Finally, even tbougb emergency pbysicians work in a different legal environment than does the doctor in an office-based practice, tbey may sbare some concern over tbe risk of regulatory action for tbe prescription of controlled substances.^Ŝ
ubordination of Pain Relief to Diagnosis
The subordination of pain relief to diagnosis in emergency medicine is likely to be one reason that interventions to relieve pain are delayed or denied in the emergency department. The emergency physician's priority is diagnosis.37 Patients share this priority for diagnosis and treatment, and some evidence indicates that patients thus may simply expect to experience suffering in the emergency department resulting in lower patient demands for analgesia.^** Other studies, bowever, indicate tbat patients bave substantial expectations for pain relief in tbe ED.^s Treatment tbat addresses only tbe symptoms of pain and neglects tbe underlying cause is recognized as substandard emergency care.''° Because botb tbe patients and tbe pbysicians in tbe context of an emergency desire accurate diagnosis above all, and because emergency medicine is beld to a medicolegal standard tbat holds them accountable for negligence in diagnosis, it is important to address tbe pain-diagnosis connection as an empirical question. There has been a strong belief in emergency medicine tbat analgesia may impede diagnosis, and tbat belief bas impeded pain management in tbe ED. Where evidence can be produced to reject tbe bypotbesis tbat interventions to relieve pain bamper diagnosis, the practice of withholding analgesia in favor of diagnosis should be expected to cbange. In sucb situations, one would not need to argue wbetber pain relief was wortb a reduction in diagnostic efficacy because tbe two concerns would not, in fact, conflict.
The case of pain management in the context of a patient presenting acute abdominal pain (often called "an acute abdomen") is illustrative. Tbe well establisbed practice and custom in emergency medicine bas been to withhold pain medication from persons wath acute abdominal pain until diagnosis or surgery. Tbis practice refiects tbe long-beld belief tbat interventions to relieve acute abdominal pain would confound tbe diagnosis of tbe underlying cause.*' Tbe firmly held, persistent "common knowledge" in emergency medicine that medication of acute abdominal pain would tbwart accurate diagnosis is based on a statement in a medical textbook from tbe 1920s. In tbat text, Sir Zacbary Cope taugbt: "tbougb it may appear cruel, it is really kind to witbbold morpbine until one is certain or not tbat surgical interference is necessary, i.e., until a reasonable diagnosis bas been made."*Ŝ imilar statements were included in tbis textbook as recently as 1979-*^ Even tbougb Sir Zacbary provided no evidence or citations for his statement, "physicians everywhere took Dr. Cope's opinion on this as their own."' *' * Sir Zacbary's opinion bas guided doctors for more tban 80 years, one generation after anotber, despite tbe fact tbat no study supported tbe practice. A study publisbed in 1998, for example, revealed that emergency physicians in the U.S. withheld analgesia for patients with acute abdominal pain even tbougb Sir Zacbary's conclusion bad been cballenged in the literature nearly 20 years before.*^ A series of studies, eacb concluding tbat treating tbe patient wdtb acute abdominal pain witb morpbine did not impede and perbaps even enbanced tbe accuracy of diagnosis, were publisbed in tbe 1990s.'^'' Studies publisbed since tbat time also failed to detect any adverse impact on diagnosis.*'' Tbe American College of Emergency Pbysicians issued its "Clinical Policy: Critical Issues for tbe Initial Evaluation and Management of Patients Presenting witb a Chief Complaint of Nontraumatic Acute Abdominal Pain," in 2000, revising its earlier policy of 1994.*" Tbe ACEP policy focuses on diagnostic strategies for tbe ED pbysician, but includes advice concerning pain management as well. Tbe ACEP policy provides:
Administration of narcotics to patients with abdominal pain to facilitate tbe diagnostic evaluation is safe, bumane, and in some cases, improves diagnostic accuracy. Incremental doses of an intravenous narcotic agent can eliminate pain but not palpation tenderness. Analgesics decrease patient anxiety and cause relaxation of their abdominal muscles, thus potentially improving the information obtained from tbe pbysical examination. Tbere is evidence tbat pain treatment does not obscure abdominal findings, or cause increased morbidity or mortality.*Î n tbe face of Sir Zacbary's warning, unsupported by any evidence, and of early studies tbat failed to document an adverse impact on diagnosis and instead produced evidence contrary to tbis traditional "knowledge," tbe ACEP panel responsible for the Policy chose to rely on early evidence, such as it was, rather than perpetuate tbe traditional practice of leaving tbe patient to suffer, a practice that was supported in none ofthe studies available at tbat time or since. ACEP's Policy recommendation regarding pain treatment for tbis category of patients is clear and firmly stated. Tbe only evidence tbat exists does not support tbe customary witbbolding of narcotics.
Tbis portion ofthe Policy, however, is categorized as an "option" rather than an "evidence-based standard" or "guideline.':' Recommendations in tbe Policy based on a "bigb degree of clinical certainty" and supported by tbe highest level of empirical research qualify as an "evidence-based standard" in ACEP's policy. In contrast, a recommendation labeled an "option" is a "strateg[y] for patient management based on preliminary, inconclusive, or confiicting evidence, or, in tbe absence of any publisbed literature, based on panel consensus."5° Tbe Policy cites four researcb articles published prior to 2000 to support the option recommending attention to pain relief for ED patients wdth acute abdominal pain.=' Tbis level of uncertainty is not unique in medicine generally or in emergency medicine in particular. In tbe same Policy, for example, ACEP could not identify evidence-based standards or even guidelines for tbe diagnosis of several disease states tbat produce "commonly missed diagnoses" or for tbe diagnosis and management of geriatric patients as a subset of bigb-risk patients. Medical researcb of any sort is difficult in emergency medicine, and federal regulations bave been developed to set up a process tbat accommodates some of tbose difficulties.'^^ Researcb on pain management in tbis situation in tbe emergency department is doubly difficult, botb etbically and legally, because tbe construction of a control group would require some number of patients to suffer without pain medication in a situation where no current studies give any indication that medicating for pain relief has an adverse effect.
Even with its limitations, one would expect the ACEP policy and the publisbed studies to cbange practice.^Ŝ ome evidence, however, indicates that ED physicians still withhold analgesia for acute abdominal pain,''* illustrating tbe difficulties in cbanging embedded professional custom, even wben no evidence supports tbe practice, as well as tbe sometimes slow diffusion of clinical knowledge.''^ Anotber study, bowever, indicated tbat tbe Policy, or similar efforts, may have had an effect, although the study is ambiguous in an important respect. In a 2002 survey of emergency departments, 59 of 60 departments completing tbe survey responded affirmatively to a survey question tbat asked: "Is it your practice as a department to ever administer narcotic analgesia to acute abdomen patients prior to a surgeon's evaluation?"'''^ A positive response to tbis inquiry does not indicate tbat it is common practice to do so, of course. Tbe survey also asked: "in tbe cases wben you do tbis, wbicb of tbe following are motivations bebind wby you do it?" Of tbe reasons given, 88.1% reported tbat tbey would provide medication to alleviate patient discomfort; 86.4% believed tbat tbe literature supports the practice; and 61% responded that "it often takes too long for the surgical consult to arrive."'^'' This latter question does indicate that there is a general awareness of the direction of current research on the matter. If clearer studies document that the practice of wdthholding analgesia in cases of acute abdominal pain does persist because of concerns over the impact on diagnosis, it may prove tbat we must look elsewhere for the reasons that pain relief is being wdtbbeld.
Tbe implementation of ACEP's policy on pain relief for tbis set of patients illustrates anotber distinctive factor in improving practices in tbe ED; i.e., tbe relationsbip of emergency department pbysicians to tbe otber specialists on whom they must rely for treatment of their patients. As recently as 1996, 89% of surgeons surveyed in a single-state survey responded tbat tbey still preferred tbat sucb patients receive no medication for pain prior to tbe surgical consult.*^ This survey of surgeons occurred less than two years before tbe survey in wbicb 86.4% of emergency pbysicians indicated tbat tbe literature supported tbe use of pain medication in tbis situation. Further illustrating the confiict between tbese two specialties is a 2003 article in the American Journal of Surgery arguing tbat tbe studies tbat detected no difference in diagnostic effectiveness were infirm and tbat, based on cases "reported anecdotally and our own experiences," analgesia can alter tbe physical examination and lead to misdiagnoses. The authors, tberefore, recommend that analgesia should be administered "only witb the knowledge and consent of the surgeon who assumes responsibility for decisionmaking."59 Tbis recommendation goes in the opposite direction of tbe ACEP Policy, and builds in significant delay in tbe treatment of patients wdtb pain tbat may be harmful if acute pain is taken seriously and, at least under the current level of research, is unnecessary.
Pain Assessment, Or You Don't Necessarily Know It When You See It
Recognizing pain, and understanding its severity, is not a simple question of empathy borne of sbared experiences. In fact, experience of pbysically painfiil incidents or stimuli is not shared. There is great variability in tbe individual experience of pain in like circumstances.^" Tbis variation is demonstrated in confiicting assessment of pain even by close intimates of tbe patient. Pain management in nursing bomes, for example, is cballenged by tbe tendency on tbe part of botb bealtb care providers and family members to underestimate pain in tbe elderly.''^ Cbildren also suffer from tbe inclination of adult caregivers, even family, to discount tbeir reports of pain.^^ Adequate pain assessment may require significant time,^^ and assessing pain in individuals watb cognitive impairment, a situation confronted watb some frequency in tbe ED, requires even more effort.^* Eurtber, strongly held assumptions that particular groups of patients, such as neonates,^'' do not feel or remember pain bave proven mistaken; and tbis seems to be tbe case witb tbe current widely beld assumption tbat sedated patients receiving emergency care do not feel or remember pain.^P erceptions of patient and pbysician as to the degree of pain experienced or expected are also often seriously divergent, including in the context of emergency treatment.'^'" Formal pain assessment techniques are intended to give voice to the patient in detecting the presence and severity of pain in a way that is informative to the health care professional and can lead to appropriate interventions to relieve pain. The importance of pain assessment is evident in the fact that the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has incorporated required pain assessment as a linchpin in the efforts to improve care of hospital patients, including specifically care provided in tbe emergency department.^'* Many studies bave identified deficiencies in pain assessment in tbe ED. Initial studies indicate tbat pain assessment is ordinarily a one-time evaluation in tbe ED and is not performed, or at least recorded, at important points after tbe initial assessment.® In particular, assessment at tbe point of transfer or discbarge, as discussed in tbe context of legal risks below, is critical to satisfying the emerging standard of care.
Pain assessment is known to be particularly difficult wbere the patient is unable to communicate, as can often occur in tbe ED because of tbe patient's age, mental disorder, trauma or stress.''" In addition, tbe emergency patient's own empbasis on diagnosis and tbe resultant expectation of pain and suffering, noted above, probably makes pain assessment more difficult in tbe ED in tbe absence of formal inquiries of tbe patient by the nurse or physician and assessment techniques designed to elicit the patient's perceptions. This assumption is based on a similar pbenomenon described in tbe case of elderly patients wbo are observed to underreport pain for fear of being a burden.''^ In addition, it appears tbat tbe expectation of pain can influence underreporting of pain.''Î ntuitively, it seems tbat effective pain management must begin witb recognizing tbe presence of pain.^^ jndeed, an increase in tbe employment of analgesia for pain in the ED once a formal pain assessment system is adopted has been demonstrated.*"* Wbile it seems obvious tbat effective pain management in tbe emergency department requires formal pain assessment, especially in ligbt of tbe divergence of perceptions between emergency pbysician and patient, tbere is some tbougbt tbat tbe apparent connection between formal pain assessment and effective treatment is not so close.''P articularly troubling and cballenging for tbe implementation of patient-directed pain assessment is evidence tbat emergency physicians interpret patients' accounts of pain in a way that supports the physician's assessment ofthe underlying situation. One study reporting bigbly variable responses among ED doctors to identical patient reports of a need for pain relief speculates tbat doctors wbo suspect that a patient is seeking drugs for other purposes will take a report of a need for pain medication as evidence confirming drug seeking bebavior, wbile physicians "who suspect the patient is truly in pain interpret the same statement [by tbe patient] as evidence tbat tbe patient is in severe pain."'''^ In addition, pbysicians witb more experience ratber than less appear to be more likely to reject patients' reports of pain, leading one autbor to argue tbat "[w]itbout ongoing education, senior physicians risk providing less, not more, pain control."''T bis pbenomenon is not confined to tbe emergency pbysician or to tbe presentation of pain as pbysicians generally have been revealed to substitute tbeir own assessment of tbe patient's symptoms.'''^ Pre-existing interpretative frameworks for patients' reporting of pain are particularly troublesome because of their infiuence on suffering and on public policy.
A Culture of Strangers under Stress?
Consideration of tbe culture of tbe ED, including tbe nature of tbe pbysician-patient relationsbip in emergency medicine, may reveal otber reasons for undertreatment of pain.™ Emergency pbysicians and nurses work in a bigbly stressful environment wbere pain and suffering are immutable and relentless companions. Tbey must act rapidly, witb tbe understanding tbat tbeir actions may jeopardize tbe patient's life or bealtb and in the face of intense uncertainty and unfamiliarity.
Infiuential research into the nature of tbe physicianpatient relationship generally bas discovered that "a central feature of doctor-patient interaction is the high degree of mutual uncertainty."*'' One bas a sense tbat tbis may be exacerbated in the context of the emergency department where the doctors' patients are strangers to them, and they to their patients. In addition, wbile a patient's trust may bridge tbe inberent mutual uncertainty in tbe ordinary doctor-patient relationsbip,^! tbere is little basis on wbicb to build trust in tbe ED encounter unless tbe patient bas a reservoir of trust banked for bospitals and doctors generally. Wbile some patients do come to tbe ED witb tbat attitude, otbers come with the entirely contrary experience.
The emergency department typically serves patients who are strangers to the care team.**^ The patient as stranger is so pronounced and profound tbat tbe issue is addressed specifically in tbe ACEP Code of Etbics for Emergency Pbysicians. Tbe Code, in tbe section on Etbical Foundations of Emergency Medicine, specifically notes tbat "emergency pbysicians cannot rely on earned trust or on any prior knowledge of tbe patient's condition, values or wishes regarding medical treatment."'^Â lthough the statement specifically references the lack of knowledge about patient's preferences, it also has obvious implications for pain assessment, most particularly for evaluation of bonesty in tbe report of tbe patient's pain.
Tbere are otber circumstances tbat also contribute to a more empbatic separation between pbysician and patient in emergency medicine as compared to otber areas of practice. For example, emergency medicine is acutely aware of its role as providers of care to tbose persons wbom everyone else has forgotten or avoids.^* Tbis selfconcept of rescue unit or safety net motivates professionals in emergency medicine to undertake tbe care of tbe abandoned and rejected as a part of tbeir professional mission. It also speaks of a differentiation or even alienation from tbe patients served, bowever, and could contribute to difficulties in pain treatment.
Tbere is evidence in otber, non-emergency bealtb care settings tbat patients witb wbom tbe pbysician is familiar receive more effective treatment for pain tban do patients wbo are less well known to tbe doctor."^ It is reasonable to ask tbe question wbetber tbis pbe-nomenon is operational in tbe ED as well, because an answer to tbat question may produce significant insigbt into tbe problem of inadequate pain management.
In emergency medicine, tbe professional investment in favor of diagnosis itself also may produce an extreme form of detacbment from tbe suffering of tbe patient wbo must be examined and treated. Tbis detacbment from patients in pain may in fact increase over time as tbe emergency department pbysician and nurse develop a tolerance for repeated and constant exposures to buman suffering.^^ Tbe personality of individuals attracted to emergency medicine may personally discount tbe seriousness of pain and discomfort botb for tbemselves and tbeir patients.^^ Maintaining a distance from tbe patient in pain may be a natural support for tbe need to proceed despite tbe patient's suffering.
Unfamiliarity, detacbment or alienation from patients may lead to a beightened fear of being tricked or duped by patients wbo bave no medical need for controlled substances for pain relief * * * * Tbis cballenge faces all pbysicians wbo treat a large number of patients in pain, but it is especially acute in tbe emergency department where the physician and the patient are usually unknown to one another. Experiences in wbicb an individual takes on tbe mantle of "patient" but lies to the pbysician in order to get drugs seem to be nearly traumatic to emergency doctors and appear to breed a sense of betrayal and guardedness tbat can persist over tbe course ofthe physician's career. Whether frequent or not, the experience is typically not an isolated incident for doctors in the emergency department. The problem is tbat tbe disgust at being tricked can become overgeneralized and result in the denial of necessary care to patients in pain.
Wben reasonable attention to this risk becomes fear, it leads to exaggerated distrust of patients' reports of pain. A pbysician's perception tbat a patient is seeking drugs for secondary gain is very powerful, so powerful tbat it may not be dislodged by anytbing tbe patient can do or say to alleviate tbat concern. As discussed above, at least one study bas revealed tbat an emergency department doctor may, in fact, interpret an identical statement in polar opposite directions. Tbe statement is interpreted as proving tbe doctor's pre-existing perception wbetber tbat is proving that the patient is lying to get drugs or that the patient's claim of pain and need is genuine.^s In addition, patients that fall within marginalized groups or groups that have been tbought, based on evidence or not, to bave bigber incidence of diversion, may face a pattern of suspicion and limitations on care in a form of^profiling.s" Many efforts bave focused on identifying indicators, often called "red flags," tbat can be used in an attempt to cope witb tbe possibility tbat some individuals may lie about their symptoms in order to get prescribed controlled substances.s^ Tbe usefulness of tbese efforts is questionable in a number of settings. Tbe common "red fiags" may be particularly unreliable wben transferred from office-based medical practice to tbe bospitalbased emergency medical practice. One commentator notes that ED doctors may be "ill advised" to rely on common "red fiags" because tbese indicators bave been developed in non-ED practice settings. For example, tbe request for a specific analgesic by a patient, commonly viewed as a red fiag indicating a drug seeking patient, could indicate tbat tbe patient is suffering severe pain wdth which he or she is quite familiar.s^ Anotber notes tbat tbe patient wbo bas been discbarged from tbe ED wdtb pain medication (or a prescription for pain medication) who calls back or returns because the medication is "not doing the job" is suspected of abusing tbe system ratber tban suffering from inadequate dosing or selection of drug, problems tbat bave been documented frequently in ED practice.^T be etbical pbysician is alert to the patient who lies to get drugs for illicit purposes, but a serious etbical problem arises wben tbe pbysician becomes bypervigilant or relies on profiling tbat gives only a general and often inaccurate picture of tbe "drug seeking" patient wdtb the result that many patients in pain are denied necessary care. In fact, emergency physicians are likely to form suspicions about patients tbat are not influenced by tbe patient's report of pain^* and tbat do not correlate witb drug abuse screening.^Ŵ hen race, socioeconomic status, source of pay for care, and related generalities are used to exclude patients from effective treatment, ethical principles of medical practice are violated. The ACEP Code of Ethics is quite clear on the ethical principle involved. The Code states that "[e]mergency pbysicians sbould act fairly toward all persons wbo rely on tbe ED for unscbeduled episodic care....Provision of emergency medical treatment should not be based on gender, age, race, socioeconomic status, or cultural background. No patient sbould ever be abused, demeaned, or given substandard care."9^ A situation wbere individuals are denied pain relief because of tbeir bealtb status (because tbey bave sickle cell or because tbey are chemically dependent, for example) or because of stereotypes about a specific population implicates tbis etbical commitment.
Tbe problem of pbysician distrust of patients is a core issue in tbe effective treatment of patients in pain. Increasingly, calls are made tbat doctors and nurses must "trust tbe patient's report of pain." Because of tbe bigb variability of tbe experience of pain and tbe impossibility in many cases of pinpointing an organic cause, the patient's report is currently the primary, if not sole. datum available. Certainly, the call to respond to patients' reports of pain with effective interventions is critical for improving the care of patients and it should be supplemented witb an equally vigorous call to doctors, nurses and other caregivers not to trust themselves in substituting tbeir own judgment of wbat tbe patient is or sbould be experiencing in terms of pain and discomfort. In particular, in tbe practice of emergency medicine, reliance on unproven, anecdotal "rules" -wbether related to Sir Zachary's prohibition on treating pain in a patient witb acute abdominal pain or profiling patients by race, socioeconomic status, or specificity in tbeir request for pain medications -needs to be eliminated.
Tbe issue of trusting patients' reports, bowever, is a complicated cballenge embedded in tbe practice of medicine generally and inberent in the training of physicians. The intense rejection of "subjectivity" in medicine is long-standing and not confined to tbe issue of pain.97 Improving tbe inadequate treatment of pain in tbe ED may emerge from tackling low-banging fruit, such as requiring pain assessment at intake and at discharge, but it also needs to be understood that some of the traits that underlie current customs and practices are endemic to medicine, perhaps exacerbated in tbe ED environment, but not limited to tbe issue of pain relief
Legal Issues in Pain Management in the Ed
Fear of legal risk has been identified as a significant barrier to effective treatment of patients in pain in a variety of settings. Concerns over tbe legal environment extend as well to tbe ED, altbougb tbe source of tbese concerns is particular to tbis context. Legal issues relating to pain management in the emergency department emerge from at least three different areas of law. They are: 1) malpractice and general tort liability; 2) tbe federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA); and 3) state and federal regulation of medical practice, especially as it relates to the prescription of controlled substances. An analysis of legal issues relating to pain management in tbe emergency department is relevant because tbe sense of legal risk bas an impact on tbe course of treatment. Perbaps more importantly in tbe context of tbe emergency department, an analysis of legal issues reveals systemic factors tbat may produce inadequate treatment for pain.
Malpractice andbeneral Tort Liability
Pbysicians bave a well establisbed legal duty to treat pain as a part of their medical treatment of a patient.^T he doctor's legal duty to relieve pain is generally supported by policy statements and standards of professional organizations and by tbe standards enforced by state licensing boards.^" JCAHO standards on tbe assessment and treatment of pain in tbe emergency department also provide support for a legal duty to treat pain effectively.'"" ACEP bas adopted several policies tbat assert the importance of treating pain.^^^ A 2005 study reported that the National Guidelines Clearinghouse included 238 guidelines on "pain management," including 143 guidelines on "acute pain management" as of December 2003.^°^ xhe courts rely on policy statements and practice guidelines promulgated by sucb organizations to establisb a legal duty to which physicians and bospitals are beld.
Litigation Concerning Negligent Treatment for Pain
Studies of malpractice lawsuits have concluded repeatedly that patients injured through negligence or malpractice generally do not file suit.io3 jn considering legal risks, efforts to improve pain management may be viewed pragmatically as a metbod for avoiding litigation, although this conclusion is largely intuitive.
While undertreatment of pain is commonly viewed as an exacerbating factor in malpractice or negligence lawsuits, neglectful pain treatment standing alone can also form tbe basis of a malpractice or negligence claim.
In Bergman v. Eden Medical Center and Tomlinson v.
Bayberry Care Center,^"* tbe surviving family members of two patients in California filed suit against tbe pbysicians, bospitals, and nursing bomes that cared for the patients. In Bergman, the jury returned a verdict of $1.5 million, which the court reduced to $250,000. In Tomlinson, the defendants (the patient's hospital physician, the nursing home physician, the hospital and the nursing home) entered into voluntary settlements with the plaintiffs, wdth undisclosed sums paid to the famiiyBergman and Tomlinson illustrate that it is possible for patients to bring suit for inadequate pain management in the absence of other negligence or malpractice. In eacb case, tbe patient was in tbe end stages of terminal cancer; tbe patient was transferred from bospital to nursing bome for tbe final days or weeks of care; tbe patient received very clearly inadequate medication; and the lawsuits were botb brougbt under tbe state's elder abuse statute.
Tbe diagnosis for eacb of tbese patients was clear, and the standard interventions for pain management were well accepted but were not provided. Treatment for cancer pain and pain at tbe end of life areas of treatment for pain in wbicb tbere is a strong medical and legal consensus. Tbere is no concern over addiction or diversion; and tbe state medical boards bave long viewed tbe use of controlled substances for cancer pain, even over a long time and in large doses, as permissible.^"L awsuits claiming neglected pain as tbe only basis for Informed consent is a serious challenge in the ED, and concerns over informed consent influence the effectiveness of interventions to increase responsiveness to patients in pain.
elderly persons and tbeir surviving family. Under tbis statute, bowever, tbe plaintiffs bad to prove tbat tbe providers bad been reckless and not merely negligent.
Tbis is a very difficult burden to meet in medical cases wbere professional judgment is so often tbe core of tbe issue. Tbe statute provided for tbe payment of attorneys' fees by tbe defendants to tbe plaintiff's attorneys, and tbese fees amounted to approximately $500,000 in tbe Bergman case. The threat of an avalanche of similar cases is not realistic because of the limits on this type of litigation. Furthermore, the facts of these cases as presented by tbe plaintiffs were quite extreme. Still, both Bergman and Tomlinson are particularly relevant to the practice of the emergency physician, even though at first glance they may be confined to terminally ill patients or patients witb cancer pain. Tbeir lesson is indeed broader, and bigbligbts two common cballenges to tbe quality of pain management for emergency medicine.
The Risks of Discontinuity of Care
The transfer from hospital to nursing home care in botb Bergman and Tomlinson resulted in a serious discontinuity in care, especially at tbe point of discbarge and transfer. Tbis is evident in tbe absence of orders or follow-up for appropriate pain medication in at least one of tbe cases, despite documentation of tbe patient's advanced cancer and consistent reports of extraordinarily severe pain.
Providing for adequate continuing pain management upon discbarge from tbe ED is an issue for many types of ED patients. Several studies bave identified serious concerns wdtb failures to account for even basic pain management needs upon discbarge.^"^ For example, a recent study of patients witb ortbopedic injuries, wbo were experiencing "acute distress" in tbe ED, revealed that 43 of 144 patients received no prescription or starter pack of medication upon discharge.^°7 Both Bergman and Tomlinson involved inadequate orders for pain medication upon discharge. The emergency physician must pay attention to transfer and discharge planning and assure that adequate medication and follow-up orders, including those required for pain management post-discbarge, are provided for tbe patient.i°8 Tbe ACEP policy on procedural sedation, for example, requires tbat continuing or developing pain and discomfort be addressed prior to discbarge.^°9 Evidence suggests tbat EDs do not ordinarily document pain assessment subsequent to tbe initial assessment."" An ongoing pain assessment in tbe ED is required for botb treatment and discbarge. Althougb there may be some question about tbe value of ongoing pain assessment during the course of treatment in the ED, it is difficult to understand how an appropriate post-discharge care plan for pain can be establisbed witbout an assessment at discbarge.
Anotber form of "discontinuity" of care presents a different kind of challenge to the physician practicing in the emergency department. Emergency pbysicians are familiar witb the situation in which a patient who regularly receives care elsewhere for a chronic illness associated with pain comes to the emergency department for treatment for an exacerbation of their condition or for an acute pain episode. Emergency departments treat a significant number of cbronic pain patients, accounting for more than one in ten of ED patients."T he emergency physician is not as familiar wdth the patient as is the patient's own physician, but it is the emergency physician's services that are required.
An even more difficult situation occurs when the ED doctor is convinced tbat tbe patient is receiving inadequate treatment, for pain or otberwdse, from tbeir OWTI pbysician or tbe facility in wbicb tbey reside. In sucb cases, consultation wdtb tbe patient's doctor may belp; serious and detailed information to tbe patient directly may allow tbe patient to take action; or admission to tbe hospital under the care of another attending pbysician may allow for more tborougb assessment and a cbange in treatment plan."P Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1674502 is brougbt to tbe emergency department wben deatb is imminent.
Tbe admission of imminently dying patients tbrougb tbe ED presents cballenges to tbe quality of care and pain management for tbese patients. Studies bave indicated that the quality of care for such patients in the ED is not better than that received in the nursing home."* Because tbe emergency doctors and nurses are not familiar witb the patient's medical condition or desires for treatment, interventions may be more acute tban is desirable."^ Emergency pbysicians need to be familiar wdtb tbe current practices and standards for effective treatment of pain at tbe end of life, and hospitals should have a plan to assure that the ED is well prepared to care for or admit these patients."*'
Informed Consent and Pain Management in the ED
Informed consent is a serious challenge in the ED, and concerns over informed consent infiuence the effectiveness of interventions to increase responsiveness to patients in pain. This infiuence is seen in several areas: a concern that pain relief cannot be provided witbout informed consent; a "common knowledge" concern tbat opioids will disable patients from consenting to necessary interventions, especially surgery; and finally, a concern over potential liability for patients wbo take medications prescribed in tbe ED and wbo tben engage in behaviors that are inadvisable because of tbe effect of tbe medications.
All medical care requires tbe informed consent ofthe patient, and medical treatment provided without consent is considered a battery. A limited exception to tbe requirement of informed consent exists in emergency situations. The classic statement of the exception for emergency treatment declares that the exception "comes into play when the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting, and barm from a failure to treat is imminent and outweigbs any barm tbreatened by tbe proposed treatment.""^ Tbe exception ordinarily would include treatment for pain in sucb circumstances.
Tbe emergency exception is actually quite narrow. It certainly does not give tbe ED carte blanche to treat every ED patient witbout consent. It only applies wbere the patient's condition is urgent and the time required for consent would put the patient at serious risk of death or severe injury."** In the case ofthe incapacitated patient, the nurse or doctor should secure the consent of a family member or other surrogate where possible without serious harm to the patient.
In litigation alleging emergency treatment without consent, several courts have concluded that consent for emergency treatment is implied by the patient's coming to the ED."9 This implied consent does not extend to situations where the physician knows that the patient objects to treatment or particular interventions, boweygj..i2o a^nd tbe notion of implied consent sbould not be relied upon too broadly. Quite frequently, an ED patient will sign a general consent form. Even witb the general consent, the care provider should continue to inform the patient concerning his or her treatment; and a more specific consent should be sougbt for any procedure or medication witb serious risks. For example, procedural sedation presents risks of damage to tbe central nervous system and depression of cardiac and respiratory functions. ACEP policy states tbat implied consent may be acceptable wbere tbe patient is unable to understand tbe necessary information due to altered mental status or severe pain and anxiety.^^^ Otberwise, separate consent to sedation is recommended.^^T be key components to informed consent are tbat tbe patient is able to understand wbat options exists as well as tbe consequences of cboosing one over anotber and is able to evaluate tbe costs and benefits of these consequences by relating tbem to a framework of values and priorities.^^^ One of tbe most serious problems regarding informed consent in tbe ED is tbe difficulty in ascertaining wbether the patient is incapacitated. The stress and duress of an emergency condition, especially one associated with severe pain, may compromise the ability of tbe patient to consent; but the patient will not be legally incapacitated. Tbe same judgment call is required for patients wbose mental state is impaired by abuse of drugs or alcohol. Of course, the characteristics ofthe relationsbip between emergency doctor and patient, as described earlier, make a judgment about tbis individual's preferences and values quite difficult. In tbat regard, tbe latitude tbat courts bave allowed emergency pbysicians in the face of challenges to a lack of informed consent refiects this situation.
ED doctors may also be concerned tbat opioid analgesia will incapacitate tbe patient and make it impossible for that patient to consent to necessary treatments. In fact, severe pain may interfere with the patient's ability to receive information and make rational risk assessments, altbougb tbe patient will not be legally incapacitated, and doctors sbould not witbbold opioid pain medication entirely for concern over incapacitating tbe patient.^2'Î n regard to any medication tbat may impair judgment, alertness, or pbysical capacity, including pain medication, tbe pbysician must inform tbe patient clearly and accurately of tbese limitations prior to discbarge. Tbe pbysician, for example, should warn the patient specifically if the medication could interfere with driving or other similar activity and document this warning. Inadequate warnings have triggered physician liability in some cases.^^^ At least one study of pre-scribing upon discbarge from tbe ED cautions ED doctors to intensify efforts in tbis regard because 7% of patients in tbat study admitted to driving wbile taking narcotics witbin 7-14 days of discbarge.^^'' Patients may cboose among different options, witb differing levels of effectiveness and adverse effects, for treatment of pain. Some patients may forego tbe most effective pain relief if it will compromise otber goals.^^'' Pbysicians and nurses need to educate tbeir patients so tbat tbe patient is not making tbis decision based on inaccurate assumptions about tbe potential for sedation or addiction.
Legal Significance of ED Policies, Protocols, and Guidelines
Hospitals typically bave policies, protocols, clinical patbways, and practice guidelines governing treatment in tbe emergency department, including for pain management and procedural sedation. Tbe advantage of establisbing written policies is tbat tbey can contribute to assuring tbat care in tbe emergency department Tbe question of autbority arises in two ways: is the professional authorized to provide the intervention under hospital policy, and is the professional authorized to do so within his or her scope of practice under state law? The scope of practice of non-physician health care professionals varies widely among the states and significantly among individual facilities. Scope of practice is significant. If a professional exceeds his or her statutory scope of practice, it is likely, absent exculpatory circumstances, that this action will be viewed as negligence per se witbout furtber proof of tbe standard of care; 12** however, some states treat this situation only as evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of negligence.
Limitations on scope of practice, wbetber establisbed by statute, custom, or tbe specific facility have a direct impact upon the treatment of emergency patients in pain. The expressed purpose of such limitations is to assure quality of care, and so they are intended to improve the care of patients and may, in fact, do so. These limitations also directly effect access to treatment through.
The fact that EMTALA does not clearly mandate treatment for pain does not mean that such treatment is not otherwise legally required.
meets the current standards of practice. Both the adequacy of and the violation of written policies will be at issue in malpractice or negligence litigation. Professional standards for treatment of pain in all settings are evolving quickly. It is not enough for policies to adopt traditional practices in this situation. Written department or hospital policies are not helpful if they are violated in practice. In fact, violation ofthe ED's own written standards creates a strong inference of negligence. Nonconformance witb hospital policies is not viewed legally as negligence per se; i.e., the plaintiff must prove that the treatment provided violated the appropriate standards of practice and not just tbe bospital's own policies. It is possible, legally, tbat treatment could violate bospital standards but still not be negligent. Nonconformance wdtb tbe hospital's own policies and practices, however, can be very persuasive to a jury and on its own provide tbe legal basis for liability in a claim brougbt under EMTALA, as discussed below.
Scope of Practice of Non-physicians "Scope of practice" refers to tbe autbority of tbe nonpbysician health care professional to deliver necessary treatment. In the area of pain management, authority to administer intravenous medications; to prescribe medications tbat are controlled substances; and to sedate tbe patient for painful procedures all fall witbin the ambit of "scope of practice." for example, limiting prescribing autbority or requiring direct pbysician supervision ofthe non-physician professional. One ofthe areas of particular concern in tbe context of emergency treatment is tbe significant delay in providing treatment for tbe relief of severe, acute pain, as discussed earlier. Limitations on the scope of practice of emergency medical service professionals need to be examined in this context.
A related but distinct legal issue arises in tbe context of procedural sedation and otber similar interventions. Altbougb tbe procedure may be wdthin the scope of practice allowed the professional under state licensure, the professional must also be competent by virtue of education, training and experience of performing tbe procedure. For example, a pbysician license is not limited to a particular range of medical practice, but not all pbysicians are competent to perform procedural sedation. ACEP policy asserts tbat all emergency pbysicians sbould be capable and competent in performing procedural sedation and tbat an anestbesiologist is not ordinarily required.'^s
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
If tbere is a 500-pound gorilla in the ED, it is the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires tbat a bospital receiving Medicare and operating an ED provide to any individual who "comes to" the emergency department wdth a request for aid an "appropriate medical screen-SYMPOSIUM ing examination...to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition exists." If the hospital determines that tbe individual bas "an emergency medical condition," tbe bospital must provide medical treatment to "stabilize" the condition or, alternatively, arrange for transfer through appropriate means if the patient requests transfer or if the physician (or another authorized person) certifies that the "medical benefits" of transfer outweigb tbe increased risks of transfer.^^o ED policies and practices are organized toward documenting compliance wdtb the Act. It is probably tbe most significant legal concern tbat EDs and emergency medicine doctors bave. If tbe Act were to clearly establish a legal duty for pain relief, it would be likely to bave a very significant effect. Unfortunately, tbe answer to wbetber EMTALA requires treatment for pain is not entirely clear.
Pain Assessment in the 'Appropriate Medical Screening Examination"
Tbe courts bave consistently beld tbat tbe EMTALA requirement for an "appropriate medical screening examination" to determine wbetber tbe patient bas an emergency medical condition requires no more tban tbat tbe bospital screen eacb and every ED patient in tbe manner of tbe bospital's usual policy, custom and practice.^3^ Tbe courts bave refused to apply general professional standards of care to tbe screening requirement. Thus, the courts are unlikely to adopt the policies on pain management from organizations such as ACEP and JCAHO, discussed earlier, as the legal standards for compliance with EMTALA's medical screening requirement. With the implementation of the JCAHO standards on pain assessment, however, each accredited hospital now probably includes assessment for pain wdthin their usual and customary initial and ongoing assessment and medical screening exam process. Once the hospital adopts this as practice or policy, pain assessment becomes a required element of tbe appropriate medical examination required under EM-TALA. In addition, because tbe Act specifically recognizes "severe pain" as a symptom of an emergency medical condition, it may be argued tbat pain assessment is an essential part of any screening. Finally, courts may in the very rare case hold that a hospital's standard policies, procedures, and practices are so deficient as to amount to no medical screening at all. An evaluation of the patient's report of pain is an essential diagnostic tool, and a failure to assess pain is likely to meet this extreme standard.
If EMTALA requires pain assessment at all, it is clear that the pain assessment is required at various points during the patient's care in the ED and particularly upon discharge. The Interpretive Guidelines, issued by tbe Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services for tbe surveyors wbo test compliance witb or investigate violations of EMTALA, state tbat CMS believes tbat a medical screening examination "is an ongoing process;" tbat "tbe record must refiect continued monitoring according to the patient's needs;" and that there "should be evidence of tbis evaluation prior to discbarge or transfer."^32
Pain and the Emergency Medical Condition
The statute defines "emergency medical condition" as "a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity {including severe pain) sucb tbat tbe absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in placing the health of the individual...in serious jeopardy; serious impairment to bodily functions; or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part."^^^ Tbe statute references severe pain, not as an emergency medical condition itself, but ratber as a symptom of an emergency medical condition. Despite tbe explicit reference to pain as a symptom of an emergency medical condition and despite tbe likelibood tbat tbe bospital's customary medical screening includes a pain assessment, it is not clear tbat EMTALA requires treatment for pain. EMTALA appears, tben, to adopt tbe traditional, tbougb now dated, perspective of emergency medicine that pain is merely a symptom.
Stabilization and the Relief of Pain
The statutory definition seems to anticipate that a patient may bave tbe symptom of severe pain -a manifestation of an emergency medical condition -but not actually bave an emergency medical condition. Tbe EMTALA treatment requirement is limited to tbat treatment required to "stabilize" the patient. Stabilization is defined as providing "sucb medical treatment of tbe condition as may be necessary to assure...tbat no material deterioration ofthe condition is likely to result from or occur during [transfer] . "^34 Unless pain wdll result in a material deterioration of the patient's emergency medical condition, treatment for the pain itself is not required under EMTALA.
Thus, EMTALA does not ordinarily require that the ED have the patient's pain managed prior to discharge or transfer unless the pain will cause the patient's medical condition, as defined in the Act, to deteriorate as a result. This conclusion maybe limited, bowever. Under EMTALA, tbe adequacy of tbe medical treatment required to stabilize the patient is measured against professional standards of care, not the hospital's own practices. EMTALA incorporates a malpractice standard in reviewdng the adequacy of treatment of persons wdth an emergency medical condition. As medical practice begins to view interventions to relieve pain as essential to minimally adequate care, tbe emerging standards may infiltrate EMTALA cases eitber through the malpractice standard for stabilization or because of new understandings and evidence of wbat constitutes a "material deterioration" of a patient's emergent condition and bow unrelieved pain can result in sucb deterioration. Moreover, where the emergency medical condition is mental or emotional, conditions also within the EMTALA obligation, unrelieved pain itself may be a tions or a more culturally embedded concern for being tricked by duplicitous individuals posing as patients, as discussed earlier.
Tbe public policy concerns underlying tbe Controlled Substances Act and licensure sanctions for prescribing practices are tbe risk of addiction and tbe diversion of certain medications. Tbe public policy challenge in implementing both the CSA and state standards concause of material deterioration in tbe pa-There is often confusion, for example, between tient's medical condition.
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In most EMTALA cases litigated, in fact, drug s e e k m g a n d p a m relief s e e k m g tbe complaint is tbe failure to diagnose and behaviors; a n d this confusion Can penalize treat life-threatening medical conditions particular patient grOUpS.
such as myoeardial infarction, either be-^ r o r cause tbe screening examination was inadequate or because treatment was inadequate. In tbe typical case, the pain was addressed through medication, but tbe underlying condition was not.
Tbe impact of EMTALA, if extended to encompass a duty to provide adequate pain management as a part of the duty to stabilize, would be tremendous. Emergency departments orient their documentation, and thus tbeir procedures, toward EMTALA compliance. Nevertbeless, tbe fact that EMTALA does not clearly mandate treatment for pain does not mean that such treatment is not otherwise legally required. Medical malpractice and other tort claims, such as those described above, wdll still apply.
State and Federal Regulation of Prescribing Practices
Emergency pbysicians, nurses, and otber professional and paraprofessional bealth care workers are subject to regulation tbrougb state licensure and tbrougb otber state regulations involving tbe health and safety of patients and health care workers. Work in the ED is regulated by several federal agencies, including tbe Occupational Healtb and Safety Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and tbe Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, among others.
Prescribing of medications tbat are listed as controlled substances in the schedules ofthe federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA)!^^ is regulated at botb tbe state and federal levels. Pbysicians' fear of regulatory scrutiny and intervention on tbe part of tbe state bureau of narcotics, tbe state medical licensure board, and tbe federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is a substantial barrier to access to effective pain relief for patients. Tbe fear of providing controlled substances to patients wdth no medical need for the drugs also appears to be a substantial fear among ED pbysicians.^^'' It is not clear wbetber tbis bebavior on tbe part of emergency pbysicians is attributable to a fear of legal sanccerning prescribing is to establisb restrictions and penalties for tbe dangerous or reckless prescriber wbile encouraging tbe responsible pbysician to treat pain aggressively. Because untreated pain is itself a public bealtb issue, as it promotes illness and disability, a single-minded focus on diversion and addiction does not promote tbe public bealtb and does not accomplisb tbe stated goals of government oversigbt of prescribing practices.
Certain areas of pain management bave been recognized by tbe regulators as requiring special attention and support. State medical boards bave recognized tbat individuals witb cancer pain or pain associated wdtb terminal illness are not at substantial risk of addiction or diverting their medications and are likely to need large amounts of pain medication over what can be a very long period of time.^^^ In contrast, tbe stereotypical setting tbat draws regulatory scrutiny is the physician's private office that is treating a high volume of chronic pain patients wdth less than minimal contact with patients or documentation of history, examination, or treatment plan.
It does not appear that emergency departments are particular targets for regulatory intervention by eitber state or federal authorities in regard to prescribing controlled substances for pain relief Emergency physicians have not been targeted by tbese agencies generally because of tbe limited risk of bigh-volume diversion. The private office of a reckless or criminal doctor could provide a number of patients who are addicted or diverting drugs wdth large volumes of medication over some amount of time, although it should be clear tbat no data support tbe notion tbat private physician office practices are a major source of diverted drugs.
The risk of hypervigilance when emergency physicians become overly concerned wdth the risk of providing controlled substances to patients wbo may not require tbem for relief of pain is serious. As discussed earlier, tbere is often confusion, for example, between "drug seeking" and "pain relief seeking" bebaviors; and tbis confiision can penalize particular patient groups.^^** Tbe emergency pbysician sbould engage in reasonable practices to assure that prescriptions for controlled substances meet current standards, sucb as tbose offered by tbe Federation of State Medical Boards,i39 but adjusted to the practice of emergency medicine.
In recent years, the concept of "balance" bas been used to provide a common meeting ground for those concerned wdth diversion and abuse of prescription drugs and tbose concerned wdth improving the care of patients in pain. The term, as commonly used in this context refers to a fundamental principle that government policies to prevent misuse of controlled substances should not interfere in their essential uses for the relief of pain.^*° Implicit in the concept is recognition that botb unrelieved pain and addiction are public healtb issues.
Tbus, "balance" is a regulatory goal. It is not a principle tbat translates directly to clinical practice witb an individual patient. Pbysicians surely must assess tbe benefits and risks of any medication for tbe individual. That exercise -by the physician and the patient together -involves a balancing function; but it is a balancing function of tbe risks and benefits to this particular patient, individuated by wbat is actually knowTi about specific risks of addiction for particular groups of patients. Tbis clinical assessment focuses on tbis patient's particular needs, risks and overall best interests. Tbe physician should not balance the general risk of abuse in tbe general population against tbis particular patient's best interests.
State medical boards bave made significant progress in adjusting tbeir requirements for disciplinary actions to better refiect emerging standards of care for tbe treatment of patients in pain. Tbe Federation of State Medical Boards issued guidelines for medical boards in 1998, and revised tbem in 2004.^« Tbese guidelines, adopted by many states,'*^ clearly state tbat fostering effective pain relief is a goal of tbe regulatory process; tbat pbysician prescribing will not be judged by volume or cbronicity alone, but rather by outcomes for the patients; and that the physician has an obligation to perform and document a pbysical examination of tbe patient and a care plan tbat includes appropriate follow-up. At least 23 state legislatures bave enacted "intractable pain statutes" to furtber affirm tbe importance of treating pain, and to set out some guidance for appropriate regulatory oversight of prescribing practices.'*^ In fact, some medical boards bave taken disciplinary action against pbysicians wbo bave neglected tbeir patients in pain.'** At the same time as state regulatory standards and enforcement efforts are accommodating a goal of improving quality of care for patients in pain while attending to their obligations to protect against addiction and diversion, tbe federal government bas intensified its efforts against tbe prescribing of controlled substances for pain management, and bave engaged in a strategy of bigb profile arrests and prosecutions of pbysicians. In addition, tbe DEA has parted ways with the approach developed in the majority of states.
Tbe purpose of the Controlled Substances Act, enforced by the DEA, is to control illegitimate distribution of controlled substances"^ witbout interfering witb legitimate medical and scientific practices. The tension between tbe states and the DEA on what qualifies as legitimate medical practice is growing in this issue and in others."'' The ideal, however, is that the physician be guided by tbe same or at least consistent standards as between federal and state regulators.
In recognition of tbe establishment of new practice standards in the states and the inadequacy of pain management in the U.S., the DEA issued a statement in 2001 advocating a balanced regulatory policy for prescription pain medications tbat would account both for concerns over addiction and diversion and concerns over pain management."'' In this statement, joined by 21 national organizations, the DEA recognized the regulatory balance: "We want a balanced approach tbat addresses the abuse problem witbout keeping patients from getting tbe care that they need and deserve."
The DEA took another pragmatic step toward achieving a more balanced approach to its enforcement efforts in 2003, when the agency issued a "Frequently Asked Questions" document (the FAQs)."** The approach to oversight of prescribing practices for pain management taken in tbe FAQs was consistent wdth the model guidelines publisbed earlier by tbe Federation of State Medical Boards. Tbis development brougbt state and federal efforts into harmony, allowing physicians to practice in a more predictable environment. Tbe harmonization was particularly welcome because several states bad become more interested in penalizing pbysicians for reckless disregard of pain tbrougb disciplinary actions and private parties bad brought two very high profile personal injury cases, as discussed above.
Tbe FAQs provided educational information to medical practitioners tbrougb a series of questions and answers about tbe appropriate use of opioids in tbe treatment of pain. Tbe FAQs addressed the definition of pain and its treatment; how opioids work and wbat patients need to know; the risks in the medical use of opioid analgesics; and legal and regulatory considerations, including under what circumstances the DEA would be likely to decide to investigate and wbat medical professionals needed to do to comply wdtb state and federal law.
Subsequent to their publication, the FAQs were immediately embraced by the professions that were pursuing ways to address the inadequate treatment of pain. In an eflfort to dispel the fear of legal sanction that was impeding appropriate prescribing, the FAQs were held out as an indication that physicians who comply with particular standards of patient care could do so without fear of investigation or sanction.^s Even though emergency physicians had not been the particular targets of DEA action, the literature in emergency medicine also recognized the significance of the positive changes in the legal environment on a federal and state level.''''' One such article, for example, used the FAQs to encourage emergency department professionals to abandon their fear of legal risks and "appreciate the greater protections offered...when operating by acceptable medical standards."'^'
Soon after the DEA issued the FAQs, however, the agency's commitment to the "balanced" approach began to crumble. The retrenchment began in 2003, with the release of the statement "The Myth of the Chilling Effect" on the DEA's web site.'^^ This statement identifies the mission of the DEA: "to prevent, detect and investigate the diversion of legitimately manufactured controlled substances." The statement does not specifically affirm the importance of the treatment of pain as did the 2001 joint statement and the FAQs. The statement asserts that "doctors operating within the bounds of accepted medical practice have nothing to fear from the DEA," but it does not give specific guidance as to the "bounds of accepted medical practice." The statement simply provides statistics on DEA's enforcement efforts, noting that the agency had "pursued sanctions against less than one tenth of one percent of the registered doctors" since 1999.
What was shaken by the posting of "The Myth of the Chilling Effect" was completely disassembled by the retraction of the FAQs by the DEA in November 2004. An interim policy statement (IPS) published by the DEA in the Federal Register announced the withdrawal of the FAQs,'^3 citing "misstatements" in the FAQs. The IPS clearly rejects the approach to oversight that had been adopted by the Federation of State Medical Boards and by many states. With the withdrawal of the FAQs and the substantive statements made in the IPS, the DEA has taken federal regulation and oversight for prescribing for pain in a direction that is the opposite of that taken by the majority of the states. In a letter to the DEA after the retraction of the FAQs, the National Association of Attorneys General expressed concern that "the state and federal policies are diverging with respect to the relative emphasis on ensuring the availability of prescription pain medications to those who need Although the current regulatory environment, as played out by the state medical boards and the DEA, is a difficult one for doctors treating patients in pain, and particularly chronic pain patients, the emergency department physician is somewhat insulated from the fray. Federal enforcement efforts have and probably will continue to target the office-based medical practice rather than the hospital-based emergency medicine practice. Still, even if the emergency doctor is not at particular risk of enforcement activity, chronic pain patients who are ill-served by the current regulatory environment are likely to show up at the doors of the emergency department.
Conclusion
We know little of what we need to know to improve the treatment of patients in pain who are seeking care in the emergency departments in the U.S. That we have reasons to improve that care is clear. Recognized ethical duties; enforceable legal obligations; and human compassion and empathy all drive us toward that goal. In the case of the emergency department, the seriousness of untreated pain may be underestimated if it is viewed as merely a temporary experience. Enough research exists, however, for us to be able to argue that the impact is long term.
Efforts at improving care nearly always begin with trying to discover the reason for the failure of care -discovering the "root cause," so to speak. With neglect of pain generally, we still often deal with questions: Does information change practice? Will a change in legal enforcement policies change practice? With emergency medicine, we may have even less knowledge about the reasons physicians behave the way they do. Studying emergency medicine in context, however, gives us the opportunity to look at now familiar problems in what is a very different medical culture than either the officebased or the palliative care settings, and one which struggles with uncertainty, unfamiharity, and subjectivity.
Further research is absolutely critical. The research needs to focus on the issues that lead emergency physicians to withhold interventions that could help patients as well as on the basic clinical research on the effectiveness and safety of certain interventions. Conducting research in the context of emergency medical care is very challenging, but it is worth it.
